



# Seminari di Economia

Giovedì 15 giugno 2023

Ore 12:00 – Aula Anfiteatro

Facoltà di Scienze Economiche Giuridiche e Politiche - Via Sant'Ignazio 17

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## *The effect of peremptory challenge reform on jury selection and trial outcomes*

**Abstract.** I use data from trials against Black defendants in Mississippi to estimate a model of jury selection where defense and prosecution choose which jurors to challenge strategically. The model allows comparing two jury selection procedures meant to safeguard against the inclusion of biased jurors and that are perceived as causing minorities to be under-represented. The Strike and Replace procedure presents potential jurors one-by-one to the parties, while the Struck procedure presents all potential jurors before the parties exercise their challenges. To estimate the model, I match moments of trial outcomes and of jurors' challenges by the defense and prosecution. With the parameter estimates, I assess counterfactuals in order to compare the two jury selection procedures. Results show that Struck more effectively excludes extreme jurors but leads to a worse representation of minorities and higher conviction rates of Black defendants. Granting a higher number of challenges to the parties favors the prosecution when the defendant is a minority, and so do reforms aimed at eliminating the peremptory challenge process, effectively inducing random choice of jurors.