Unions, two-tier bargaining and physical capital investment: theory and firm-level evidence from Italy

Conti, M.;Sulis, G.
2018-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we present a search and matching model in which firms invest in sunk capital equipment. By comparing two wage setting scenarios, we show that a two-tier bargaining scheme, where a fraction of the salary is negotiated at firm level, raises the amount of investment per worker in the economy compared to a one-tier bargaining scheme, in which earnings are entirely negotiated at sectoral level. The model’s main result is consistent with the positive correlation between investment per worker and the presence of a two-tier bargaining agreement that we find in a representative sample of Italian firms.
2018
Inglese
Working Paper CRENoS
12
35
9788893860864
scientifica
Unions; investment; hold-up; two-tier bargaining; control function
no
Cardullo, G.; Conti, M.; Sulis, G.
298
5.12 Altro
open
5 Altro::5.12 Altro
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
3
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